Engineering Effective Response to Outbreaks of Influenza by Finkelstein, Stan Neil et al.
ESD Working Paper Series
ESD-WP-2014-07 March 2014
Engineering Effective Response to Outbreaks of Influenza
Stan Finkelstein
Senior Research Scientist, Engineering
Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and 
Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences
& Technology 





Mitsui Professor of Engineering Systems
Engineering Systems Division




Acting Director at the Institute of Master






New York, NY USA
Email: teytannagmail.com
esd.mit.edu/wps








































	   2	  
	  	  
Abstract	  	  
Objective.	  	  Allocation	  of	  vaccines	  and	  deployment	  of	  non-­‐pharmaceutical	  interventions	  (NPIs)	  are	  critical	  to	  controlling	  influenza.	  	  We	  examine	  how	  these	  policies	  can	  minimize	  the	  societal	  impact.	  	  	  
Methods.	  	  An	  engineering	  systems	  framing	  and	  modeling	  approach	  incorporates	  theories	  and	  data	  on	  the	  spread	  of	  influenza.	  	  Models	  employed	  data	  from	  the	  CDC	  and	  state	  governments	  on	  cases	  and	  vaccine	  administered	  during	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  outbreak,	  and	  published	  literature	  on	  how	  to	  reduce	  human-­‐to-­‐human	  contacts.	  	  	  
Results.	  	  During	  the	  outbreak,	  barely	  half	  of	  all	  states	  received	  proportional	  allotments	  of	  vaccine	  in	  time	  to	  protect	  any	  citizens,	  while	  fewer	  sought	  vaccine	  after	  the	  peak.	  While	  individuals	  prone	  to	  contract	  and	  spread	  infection	  drive	  the	  progression,	  diligent	  hygiene	  practices	  and	  social	  distancing	  measures	  can	  drive	  down	  the	  number	  of	  cases.	  	  
Conclusions.	  	  NPIs	  are	  highly	  effective	  in	  reducing	  the	  spread	  of	  influenza	  before,	  but	  also	  after	  vaccine	  is	  administered.	  Policies	  to	  allocate	  vaccine	  in	  direct	  proportion	  to	  population	  should	  be	  replaced	  and	  larger	  stocks	  sent	  to	  regions	  where	  greater	  numbers	  of	  persons	  stand	  to	  be	  protected.	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Introduction	  Seasonal	  outbreaks	  of	  influenza	  are	  costly	  in	  human	  and	  economic	  terms.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  tens	  of	  thousands	  die	  each	  year,	  and	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  more	  worldwide.	  	  Annual	  economic	  losses	  have	  been	  estimated	  to	  be	  tens	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars,	  accounting	  for	  costs	  of	  medical	  care	  and	  loss	  of	  life.1	  Pandemics,	  occurring	  much	  less	  frequently,	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  more	  disastrous	  than	  an	  exchange	  between	  warring	  nations.	  	  According	  to	  historical	  accounts,	  the	  1918-­‐19	  Spanish	  Flu	  pandemic	  killed	  more	  than	  40	  million	  people;	  more	  than	  died	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.2	  	  Vaccines	  traditionally	  have	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  societal	  interventions	  to	  mitigate	  the	  impact	  of	  influenza	  outbreaks.	  Periods	  as	  long	  as	  six	  months	  may	  elapse	  while	  the	  vaccine	  is	  configured,	  tested,	  manufactured	  and	  distributed.	  Changes	  in	  human	  behavior	  with	  respect	  to	  hygiene	  and	  social	  distancing	  also	  constitute	  first-­‐order	  control	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  infections	  and	  have	  been	  termed,	  “Non-­‐Pharmaceutical	  Interventions”	  (NPI’s).	  Considered	  by	  many	  to	  serve	  as	  “placeholders”	  until	  vaccine	  becomes	  available,	  it	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  continual	  use	  of	  diligent	  behaviors	  confers	  great	  benefits	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  outbreaks	  of	  contagious	  illness.	  Vaccines	  and	  NPIs	  have	  been	  incorporated	  into	  mitigation	  policies	  advocated	  by	  public	  health	  officials	  and	  are	  widely	  publicized.	  	  Engineering	  effective	  response	  to	  outbreaks	  of	  influenza	  aims	  to	  derive	  the	  greatest	  value	  from	  vaccines,	  from	  NPIs	  and	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  interventions.	  Current	  practices	  for	  allocating	  and	  distributing	  vaccine	  are	  fundamentally	  flawed,	  sometimes	  resulting	  in	  its	  arrival	  to	  regions	  where	  the	  illness	  outbreak	  has	  peaked,	  and	  where	  individuals	  have	  little	  interest	  in	  becoming	  immunized.	  And	  NPI’s	  could	  have	  even	  greater	  impact	  when	  targeted	  at	  population	  groups	  most	  at	  risk	  to	  transmit	  or	  contract	  illness.	  	  We	  report	  findings	  from	  models	  of	  transmission	  of	  influenza	  that	  examine	  alternative	  policies	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  control	  on	  influenza.	  We	  argue	  that	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  vaccine,	  coupled	  with	  suitably	  targeted	  and	  appropriately	  timed	  advocacy	  of	  NPIs	  can	  saves	  lives,	  reduce	  cases	  and	  costs,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  seasonal	  outbreak	  or	  pandemic.	  	  
METHODS	  Engineering	  effective	  response	  to	  an	  outbreak	  requires	  design	  of	  processes	  to	  mitigate	  the	  seriousness	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  illness	  and	  to	  mount	  a	  total	  system	  response	  to	  it.	  	  Components	  of	  this	  approach	  include	  effective	  design	  of	  vaccine	  allocation	  and	  distribution	  processes	  and	  developing	  solutions	  to	  anticipated	  supply	  chain	  disruptions	  that	  are	  highly	  likely	  to	  occur.	  A	  broad	  engineering	  mindset	  extends	  beyond	  addressing	  well-­‐defined	  operational	  issues,	  to	  developing	  new	  models	  of	  disease	  control.	  Understanding	  disease	  dynamics	  is	  key.	  Influenza	  disease	  dynamics	  are	  partly	  under	  our	  individual	  and	  collective	  control	  and	  any	  engineered	  system	  in	  anticipation	  of	  flu	  must	  take	  this	  into	  account.	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  We	  constructed	  mathematical	  models	  that	  afford	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  vaccines	  and	  also	  both	  government-­‐imposed	  and	  individually	  elective	  behavioral	  measures,	  including	  social	  distancing	  and	  personal	  hygiene	  practices.	  Following	  is	  a	  review	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  incorporated	  into	  the	  models	  and	  the	  sources	  of	  data	  used	  in	  their	  execution.	  	  
CONCEPTS	  UNDERLYING	  THE	  MODELS	  
REFLECTING	  ON	  R0,	  THE	  REPRODUCTIVE	  RATIO.	  A	  critical	  parameter	  used	  in	  almost	  everyone‘s	  modeling	  of	  influenza	  transmission	  is	  R0,	  the	  basic	  reproductive	  
ratio	  or	  basic	  reproductive	  number,	  usually	  defined	  to	  be	  the	  average	  number	  of	  new	  infections	  generated	  by	  a	  “typical”	  infected	  person	  in	  a	  population	  of	  100%	  susceptible	  individuals.	  	  Note	  that	  R0	  is	  an	  average,	  implying	  that	  it	  has	  a	  probability	  distribution	  whose	  mean	  is	  R0.	  	  Early	  in	  the	  outbreak,	  R0	  is	  the	  average	  growth	  factor,	  “generation	  to	  generation”	  of	  newly	  infected	  individuals.	  	  An	  R0	  of	  2,	  for	  instance,	  would	  indicate	  that	  early	  in	  the	  outbreak	  an	  average	  infected	  person	  transmits	  the	  disease	  to	  an	  average	  of	  two	  others.	  	  Any	  R0	  less	  than	  1.0	  virtually	  guarantees	  that	  the	  illness	  will	  die	  out.	  	  A	  near-­‐term	  exponential	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  will	  become	  infected	  with	  the	  flu	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	  an	  R0	  value	  greater	  than	  1.0.	  	  But	  even	  the	  concept	  of	  R0	  is	  problematic,	  as	  we	  discuss	  below.	  	  A	  significant	  issue	  with	  the	  flu	  is	  that	  an	  infected	  and	  infectious	  person	  can	  be	  asymptomatic	  for	  a	  day	  or	  more,	  unknowingly	  spreading	  the	  flu	  to	  others,	  and	  only	  later	  come	  down	  with	  flu	  symptoms	  –	  at	  which	  point	  he	  or	  she	  will	  most	  likely	  self-­‐isolate	  and	  most	  often	  eventually	  recover.	  	  This	  fact	  makes	  R0	  larger	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been,	  had	  there	  been	  no	  asymptomatic	  infectious	  period	  prior	  to	  arrival	  of	  flu	  symptoms.	  	  	  	  	  How	  is	  R0	  determined?	  	  The	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  and	  U.S.	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  (CDC)	  often	  ‘announce’	  the	  R0	  value	  for	  a	  new	  flu	  virus.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  numerical	  values	  estimated	  for	  R0	  for	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  flu	  tended	  to	  be	  between	  1.4	  and	  above	  2.0.3	  These	  announcements	  and	  associated	  research	  papers	  seem	  to	  assume	  a	  world	  in	  which	  R0	  is	  beyond	  human	  control,	  as	  if	  
R0	  were	  “nature’s	  constant”	  associated	  with	  a	  given	  virus.	  	  	  But	  Larson	  demonstrated	  that	  R0	  can	  be	  represented	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  the	  innate	  characteristics	  of	  the	  virus.	  	  The	  relationship	  involves	  an	  infected	  person’s	  frequency	  of	  human-­‐to-­‐human	  contact	  (λ)	  and	  his/her	  conditional	  probability	  of	  transmitting	  illness	  (p),	  given	  close	  contact,	  as	  follows:	  	  
R0	  =λp.	  	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  	  This	  simple	  equation	  shows	  that	  R0	  is	  a	  function	  of	  both	  the	  inherent	  properties	  of	  the	  given	  virus	  –	  as	  represented	  in	  part	  by	  p	  –	  and	  the	  population’s	  behavioral	  responses	  to	  it	  –	  as	  represented	  by	  λ	  and	  also	  by	  p.	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How	  do	  we	  reduce	  λ	  and	  p?	  	  One	  reduces	  λ	  simply	  by	  having	  fewer	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contacts	  each	  day.	  	  What	  about	  p?	  	  Vaccines	  are	  probably	  the	  best-­‐known	  way	  of	  reducing	  p.	  	  But	  p	  is	  a	  function	  of	  three	  factors:	  	  (1)	  the	  innate	  infectivity	  of	  the	  virus;	  (2)	  the	  hygienic	  practices	  of	  the	  infected	  and	  infectious	  individual	  having	  the	  close	  contact;	  and	  (3)	  the	  vaccine	  status	  and	  hygienic	  practices	  of	  the	  non-­‐infected	  but	  possibly	  susceptible	  individual	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  close	  contact.	  	  While	  (1)	  is	  uncontrollable,	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  represent	  opportunities	  to	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  passing	  the	  infection	  along	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  is	  susceptible	  without	  vaccine.	  	  NPI	  examples	  including	  personal	  hygiene	  practices	  such	  as	  frequent	  aggressive	  hot-­‐water	  hand	  washing	  and	  not	  touching	  one’s	  face	  with	  one’s	  hands.	  	  Social	  distancing	  also	  plays	  a	  critical	  role,	  as	  in	  avoiding	  handshakes,	  perhaps	  bowing	  instead.	  	  In	  our	  models,	  R0	  is	  a	  key	  measure	  incorporating	  the	  range	  of	  determinants	  of	  the	  spread	  and	  control	  of	  an	  infectious	  outbreak.	  	  	  
STOCHASTICITY.	  	  While	  R0	  provides	  an	  easy	  and	  computationally	  intuitive	  basis	  for	  describing	  disease	  dynamics,	  it	  has	  a	  number	  of	  limitations,	  and	  these	  tend	  to	  be	  distributional.	  	  First,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  R0	  is	  the	  mean	  of	  a	  probability	  mass	  function.	  	  	  Consider	  an	  R0	  value	  of	  2.0.	  	  At	  one	  extreme,	  all	  the	  probability	  may	  be	  located	  at	  2,	  and	  with	  deterministic	  regularity	  each	  newly	  infected	  person	  early	  in	  the	  pandemic	  would	  infect	  exactly	  2	  others.	  	  But	  that	  is	  idealistically	  simplistic,	  and	  no	  human	  population	  would	  behave	  in	  such	  a	  robotic	  manner.	  	  More	  likely,	  the	  probability	  mass	  function	  might	  resemble	  a	  geometric	  function,	  starting	  at	  0	  and	  having	  mean	  2.	  	  Such	  a	  function	  anticipates	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  variability	  on	  the	  number	  of	  new	  infections	  generated	  by	  any	  infectious	  individual.	  	  And	  one	  can	  think	  of	  limiting	  cases	  at	  the	  other	  extreme	  with	  most	  probability	  located	  at	  zero	  and	  with	  a	  small	  amount	  at	  a	  large	  number	  such	  as	  40,	  with	  mean	  still	  equal	  to	  2.	  	  This	  type	  of	  situation	  involves	  so-­‐called	  ‘super-­‐spreaders’	  who	  if	  active	  early	  in	  the	  pandemic	  can	  catapult	  it	  to	  major	  status	  but	  who	  if	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  early	  will	  result	  in	  a	  flu	  that	  dies	  out	  rapidly,	  even	  with	  an	  R0	  value	  of	  2.	  	  So,	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  R0	  is	  the	  mean	  of	  a	  distribution	  and	  its	  variance	  and	  in	  fact	  entire	  functional	  form	  will	  have	  a	  huge	  role	  to	  play	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  disease.	  	  
HETEROGENEITY.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  stochasticity,	  we	  have	  another	  distributional	  issue	  with	  R0	  	  –	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  population.	  	  	  Members	  of	  a	  population	  are	  heterogeneous	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  personal	  characteristics	  and	  their	  behaviors.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  each	  person	  in	  the	  population	  has	  his	  or	  her	  “own”	  value	  of	  R0.	  	  And	  this	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  individual.	  A	  possibly	  infectious	  grocery	  store	  checkout	  clerk	  who	  interacts	  with	  perhaps	  hundreds	  of	  persons	  each	  day	  can,	  by	  staying	  home	  for	  a	  day,	  greatly	  reduce	  her	  personal	  R0.	  	  	  And	  during	  a	  workday,	  she	  can	  reduce	  her	  R0	  by	  not	  touching	  people	  directly	  and	  by	  washing	  hands	  with	  hot	  soapy	  water	  frequently.	  	  As	  an	  outbreak	  of	  influenza	  evolves,	  decision	  makers	  receive	  aggregate	  statistics	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  number	  of	  people	  reporting	  to	  physicians	  with	  flu-­‐like	  symptoms,	  number	  of	  related	  hospital	  admissions,	  number	  of	  flu-­‐related	  deaths,	  and	  number	  of	  vaccinations	  administered.	  	  Yet,	  aggregate	  statistics	  hide	  the	  fact	  that	  early	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transmission	  and	  propagation	  of	  the	  disease	  are	  driven	  largely	  by	  particular	  segments	  of	  the	  population:	  (1)	  those	  who	  are	  highly	  active	  in	  daily	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounters;	  (2)	  those	  who	  are	  overly	  prone	  to	  become	  infected	  given	  exposure;	  and	  (3)	  those	  who	  shed	  virus	  and	  spread	  the	  disease	  more	  than	  average.	  Any	  person	  can	  be	  characterized	  along	  a	  spectrum	  of	  these	  three	  attributes:	  social	  activity,	  proneness	  to	  infection,	  and	  proneness	  to	  shed	  virus	  and	  spread	  infection.	  Those	  who	  are	  at	  the	  ‘right-­‐hand-­‐tails’	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  distributional	  attributes	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  early	  spread	  of	  the	  disease.	  Such	  individuals,	  due	  to	  early	  infection	  and	  later	  immunity,	  drop	  out	  of	  the	  susceptible	  population	  near	  the	  middle	  and	  almost	  certainly	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  	  The	  best	  available	  data	  on	  human	  contacts	  is	  from	  two	  published	  sources.	  Fu	  reports	  a	  study	  of	  3000	  respondents	  from	  nine	  countries	  and	  46	  different	  settings	  who	  were	  asked	  to	  estimate	  daily	  personal	  contacts,	  including	  face-­‐to-­‐face,	  telephone,	  mail	  and	  Internet.	  In	  a	  separate	  study,	  for	  Taiwan	  only,	  Fu	  found	  that	  83%	  of	  reported	  contacts	  were	  face-­‐to-­‐face45.	  In	  a	  separate	  report,	  the	  Mossong	  group	  conducted	  a	  thorough	  study	  of	  contacts	  by	  participants	  in	  eight	  European	  countries.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  record	  their	  daily	  contacts,	  defined	  as	  either	  “skin-­‐to-­‐skin”	  or	  a	  two-­‐way	  conversation	  with	  three	  or	  more	  words	  in	  the	  physical	  presence	  of	  another	  person.	  The	  information	  from	  participants’	  diaries	  was	  weighed	  to	  match	  the	  demographics	  of	  participating	  countries.	  The	  group	  published	  distributions	  of	  daily	  contacts	  by	  individuals	  from	  each	  country.6	  We	  incorporated	  data	  from	  four	  of	  those	  countries,	  Belgium,	  Great	  Britain,	  Germany	  and	  Poland	  into	  our	  models	  and	  subsequent	  analysis.	  	  Population	  heterogeneity	  due	  to	  widely	  differing	  frequencies	  of	  social	  contacts	  and	  also	  due	  to	  infection	  proneness	  and	  to	  virus	  shedding	  behavior	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  speed	  of	  infection	  spread	  aside	  and	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  estimation	  and	  even	  definition	  of	  R0.	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  people	  who	  are	  most	  susceptible	  to	  infection	  are	  also	  those	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  spread	  it	  to	  others;	  the	  most	  socially	  active	  people	  combine	  these	  two	  attributes.	  To	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  flu	  spread,	  or	  the	  spread	  of	  any	  human-­‐to-­‐human	  infectious	  disease,	  one	  must	  account	  for	  such	  population	  heterogeneities.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  R0,	  people	  who	  have	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  attributes	  largely	  drive	  the	  early	  exponential	  growth	  of	  the	  disease:	  	  socially	  active,	  infection-­‐prone	  and	  efficient	  virus	  shedders.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  our	  definition	  of	  R0,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  represent	  the	  generation-­‐to-­‐generation	  early	  exponential	  growth	  of	  the	  disease,	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  nuanced	  that	  simply:	  	  “…average	  number	  of	  new	  infections	  generated	  by	  a	  ‘typical’	  infected	  person	  in	  a	  population	  of	  100%	  susceptible	  individuals.”	  	  “Typical”	  is	  too	  vague.	  	  One	  suggested	  change	  is	  to	  replace	  “typical	  infected	  person”	  with	  “typical	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction	  with	  an	  infected	  person.”	  	  Such	  a	  change	  would	  automatically	  account	  for	  those	  early	  in	  the	  disease	  growth	  with	  greater-­‐than-­‐average	  social	  activity	  –	  focusing	  on	  interactions	  and	  not	  individuals.	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Most	  published	  models	  of	  population	  heterogeneity	  utilize	  ‘compartmentalized	  models,’	  in	  effect	  discretizing	  the	  population	  and	  placing	  each	  person	  into	  one	  of	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  homogeneous	  segments.	  	  Larson	  and	  Teytelman7	  generalize	  that	  approach	  to	  eliminate	  the	  need	  for	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  discrete	  classes	  of	  statistically	  identical	  individuals,	  and	  instead,	  introduce	  a	  continuous	  distribution	  for	  all	  the	  key	  parameters	  in	  question,	  in	  essence	  employing	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  classes.	  	  Their	  generalized	  model	  deals	  with	  all	  three	  attributes	  introduced	  above:	  social	  activity,	  proneness	  to	  infection,	  and	  proneness	  to	  spread	  infection.	  The	  model	  relies	  on	  just	  a	  few	  equations	  that	  define	  the	  state	  of	  infection	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  	  
Model	  structure	  The	  most	  common	  models	  for	  influenza	  spread	  follow	  some	  variant	  of	  the	  S-­‐I-­‐R	  compartmental	  approach,	  where	  each	  person	  is	  susceptible,	  infected,	  recovered	  (or	  deceased).	  	  These	  models	  are	  most-­‐often	  used	  in	  a	  homogeneous	  setting,	  where	  all	  people	  in	  a	  compartment	  behave	  identically,	  and	  mix	  randomly.	  	  One	  may	  call	  the	  approach	  “models	  of	  statistical	  clones.”	  	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  this	  approach	  is	  incomplete	  because	  it	  ignores	  heterogeneity,	  of	  which	  a	  well-­‐known	  example	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  “super-­‐spreaders”.	  More	  typical	  are	  populations	  in	  which	  some	  members	  more	  actively	  spread	  or	  contract	  illness	  than	  others.	  Our	  approach	  has	  been	  to	  use	  discrete-­‐time	  models	  and	  to	  account	  for	  heterogeneity	  via	  proportional	  mixing,	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  infected	  in	  proportion	  to	  his	  or	  her	  contact	  rate.	  We	  introduce	  a	  continuous	  distribution	  for	  three	  parameters	  of	  interest	  –	  social	  activity,	  proneness	  to	  infection	  and	  proneness	  to	  spread	  infection.	  The	  initial	  focus	  is	  on	  contact	  rates,	  the	  available	  measure	  of	  social	  activity.	  The	  model	  relies	  on	  difference	  equations	  that	  define	  the	  state	  of	  infection	  at	  a	  given	  time	  and	  allow	  the	  calculation	  of	  R(t),	  the	  analog	  of	  R0	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time,	  as	  the	  outbreak	  evolves.	  	  The	  unit	  of	  time	  is	  a	  generation	  of	  influenza,	  defined	  here	  as	  the	  two-­‐to-­‐three	  day	  period	  during	  which	  a	  person	  becomes	  infected	  and	  soon	  infectious	  and	  interacts	  in	  society.	  	  
R(t)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  new	  infections	  caused	  by	  a	  ‘typical’	  infected	  person	  during	  generation	  t	  of	  disease	  progression.	  	  Since	  more	  and	  more	  people	  become	  immune	  to	  infection	  as	  the	  disease	  progresses,	  due	  to	  vaccination	  or	  to	  recovery	  and	  hence	  immunity	  to	  further	  infection,	  we	  always	  have	  or	  any	  flu	  generation	  t	  >1,	   .	  	  That	  is,	  the	  exponential	  rate	  of	  growth	  slows,	  grows	  less	  than	  exponentially,	  eventually	  stops	  growing	  (when	  R(t)	  =	  1),	  and	  then	  declines.	  The	  full	  formulation	  of	  the	  model	  has	  been	  published	  elsewhere.8	  	  
HUMAN	  CONTACT	  AND	  BEHAVIOR.	  When	  studying	  and	  modeling	  sexually	  transmitted	  diseases,	  especially	  HIV/AIDS,	  behavioral	  changes	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  main	  factors	  determining	  transmission	  dynamics,	  but	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  modeling	  flu,	  behavior	  is	  almost	  always	  ignored.	  This	  is	  puzzling,	  and	  in	  our	  opinion	  quite	  an	  incorrect	  approach.	  	  Few	  would	  dispute	  the	  observation	  that	  people	  alter	  their	  behavior	  during	  an	  outbreak	  by	  adopting	  more	  diligent	  hygiene,	  and	  by	  decreasing	  their	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  or	  closeness	  of	  human	  contacts.	  	  Recent	  history	  has	  provided	  us	  with	  multiple	  examples	  of	  people	  responding	  to	  news	  of	  a	  disease	  by	  altering	  their	  daily	  behavior.	  
! 
R(t +1) < R(t) < R0
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  Consider	  the	  example	  of	  the	  social	  behavior	  changes	  that	  occurred	  during	  SARS	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  2003.	  One	  survey	  indicates	  that	  during	  the	  SARS	  outbreak	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  87%	  of	  the	  population	  covered	  their	  mouths	  while	  sneezing	  or	  coughing,	  76%	  of	  individuals	  wore	  masks,	  65%	  washed	  their	  hands	  after	  contact	  with	  possibly	  contaminated	  objects.	  	  Residents	  who	  thought	  that	  they	  might	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  SARS	  voluntarily	  self-­‐isolated	  for	  up	  to	  ten	  days.	  	  Economic	  factor	  studies	  in	  SARS-­‐affected	  cities	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  Beijing,	  Singapore	  and	  Toronto	  indicate	  that	  there	  was	  a	  sharp	  drop	  in	  interactive	  social	  activities	  as	  restaurants	  and	  entertainment	  centers	  suffered	  plummeting	  numbers	  of	  clientele.	  Specifically	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  tourism	  was	  crippled	  in	  March	  2003	  when	  the	  WHO	  issued	  a	  rare	  warning	  for	  travelers	  to	  avoid	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  China’s	  Guangdong	  Province.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  weakening	  demand,	  airlines	  slashed	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  flights,	  and	  hotels	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  reportedly	  were	  up	  to	  90%	  empty.	  	  But	  SARS	  was	  stopped,	  and	  yet	  no	  pharmaceutical	  cure	  was	  found.9	  	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  the	  eradication	  of	  SARS	  was	  due	  to	  collective	  behavioral	  changes	  of	  the	  overall	  population	  and	  of	  medical	  caregivers,	  in	  effect	  causing	  R0	  to	  drop	  significantly	  below	  1.0.	  	  This	  represents	  an	  existence	  proof	  that	  
R0	  can	  be	  largely	  determined	  by	  individual	  and	  collective	  behavioral	  change.	  	  This	  is	  
a	  profound	  result.	  	  It	  suggests	  that	  R0	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  abstract	  as	  a	  constant	  of	  any	  given	  infectious	  disease.	  	  To	  be	  concrete,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  for	  the	  WHO	  or	  the	  CDC	  to	  state	  publicly	  that	  a	  new	  influenza	  virus	  is	  circulating	  the	  Earth	  with	  an	  R0	  value	  of,	  say,	  1.432.	  	  Rather,	  the	  local	  population	  and	  their	  individual	  and	  collective	  behaviors	  contextually	  determine	  R0.	  	  In	  the	  future,	  it	  is	  entirely	  plausible	  that	  when	  a	  novel	  virus	  surfaces	  there	  will	  be	  communities	  for	  which	  R0	  is	  less	  than	  1.0	  and	  other	  communities,	  such	  as	  those	  living	  in	  close	  and	  closed	  quarters,	  where	  R0	  could	  exceed	  2	  or	  3	  or	  more.	  	  
DATA	  	  
Disease	  dynamics	  and	  vaccine	  distribution.	  	  We	  applied	  our	  modeling	  approach	  using	  data	  from	  the	  CDC	  and	  state	  health	  departments	  from	  the	  2008-­‐09	  outbreak	  of	  H1N1	  influenza.	  We	  estimated	  the	  epidemic	  curves	  for	  the	  US	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  for	  48	  states	  with	  influenza-­‐like-­‐illness	  (ILI)	  data,	  obtained	  from	  state	  health	  departments.	  The	  CDC	  considers	  ILI	  data	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  following	  the	  dynamics	  of	  progression	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  Sentinel	  sites	  report	  the	  proportion	  of	  outpatient	  visits,	  hospitalizations	  and	  deaths	  associated	  with	  ILIs	  to	  the	  CDC	  via	  ILINet,	  an	  online	  reporting	  system.10	  The	  CDC	  tabulates	  these	  data	  on	  national	  and	  regional	  levels	  and	  publishes	  results	  weekly	  in	  FluView.11	  We	  compared	  the	  epidemic	  curves	  we	  derived	  with	  two	  sources	  of	  vaccine	  distribution	  data.	  The	  first	  is	  vaccine	  shipment	  data,	  which	  track,	  for	  all	  fifty	  states,	  the	  number	  of	  doses	  of	  vaccine	  shipped	  to	  each	  state	  over	  time.	  The	  second	  source	  provided	  data	  on	  vaccine	  actually	  administered,	  as	  each	  healthcare	  provider	  was	  required	  to	  report	  numbers	  of	  flu	  vaccinations	  administered	  by	  state	  and	  local	  health	  authorities	  before	  being	  given	  additional	  vaccine.	  We	  obtained	  this	  latter	  information	  from	  individual	  health	  departments	  of	  nine	  states.	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Results	  
Illness	  dynamics	  and	  vaccine	  allocations	  as	  delivered	  As	  previously	  reported,	  during	  the	  2008-­‐09	  outbreak	  of	  H1N1	  influenza,	  in	  24	  of	  50	  states,	  the	  outbreak	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  decline	  before	  individuals	  were	  actually	  protected	  by	  vaccination	  immunization.	  Further,	  among	  11	  states,	  no	  more	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  state’s	  residents	  were	  vaccinated	  before	  the	  outbreak	  had	  peaked.	  	  	  For	  each	  of	  eleven	  states,	  our	  model	  was	  fitted	  to	  the	  reported	  ILI	  data	  to	  create	  two	  separate	  model-­‐estimated	  epidemic	  curves:	  	  the	  first	  assuming	  no	  vaccines	  delivered	  and	  the	  second	  incorporating	  actual	  vaccine	  administration	  data	  for	  the	  state.	  	  	  We	  also	  generated	  a	  third	  model-­‐based	  epidemic	  curve,	  one	  showing	  the	  curve	  if	  the	  vaccine	  had	  been	  delivered	  two	  weeks	  earlier	  than	  actual.	  We	  were	  then	  able	  to	  infer	  the	  proportion	  of	  infections	  that	  (1)	  were	  averted	  due	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  vaccine,	  even	  if	  late;	  and	  (2)	  would	  have	  been	  averted	  if	  the	  vaccine	  supplies	  had	  been	  received	  two	  weeks	  earlier.	  	  Averted	  infections	  ranged	  from	  as	  much	  as	  nearly	  14%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Massachusetts,	  where	  the	  outbreak	  occurred	  later,	  to	  as	  little	  as	  0.14%	  in	  Mississippi	  which	  experienced	  a	  much-­‐earlier	  outbreak.	  	  	  
Discussion	  To	  engineer	  an	  effective	  response	  to	  an	  outbreak	  of	  influenza,	  one	  would	  deploy	  technology	  (e.g.,	  vaccine)	  and	  effect	  changes	  in	  human	  behavior,	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  contract	  rate	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  illness	  transmission.	  Both	  NPI’s	  and	  vaccines	  are,	  of	  course,	  key	  components	  of	  the	  public	  health	  response.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  society	  will	  implement	  severe	  measures	  as	  they	  did	  in	  1918-­‐1919	  making	  it	  “unlawful	  to	  cough	  and	  sneeze”	  punishing	  violators	  with	  up	  to	  a	  year	  in	  jail.	  However,	  even	  without	  forceful	  implementation	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  try	  to	  decrease	  their	  likelihood	  of	  becoming	  ill	  by	  improving	  hygiene	  related	  behaviors.	  We	  control	  the	  contact	  rate,	  for	  example,	  by	  switching	  from	  daily	  to	  weekly	  grocery	  shopping,	  or,	  better	  yet,	  to	  having	  groceries	  delivered	  to	  one’s	  door.	  If	  you	  manage	  a	  team	  of	  employees,	  rather	  than	  having	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meetings	  during	  a	  flu	  emergency,	  have	  conference	  calls	  instead,	  with	  many	  workers	  telecommuting.	  Many	  companies	  have	  already	  created	  comprehensive	  pandemic	  flu	  plans	  that	  include	  telecommuting,	  reduced	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounters	  and	  even	  increased	  desk	  spacing	  between	  workers.	  	  	  Vaccines	  and	  NPI’s	  both	  contribute	  to	  reducing	  the	  probability	  that	  any	  given	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  will	  result	  in	  a	  new	  infection.	  Wash	  hands	  with	  hot	  water	  and	  soap	  several	  times	  daily.	  Do	  not	  shake	  hands	  during	  greetings	  with	  colleagues.	  Cough	  or	  sneeze	  into	  your	  elbow,	  not	  into	  the	  open	  air	  or	  your	  bare	  hand.	  Be	  careful	  not	  to	  touch	  surfaces	  that	  might	  have	  recently	  been	  contaminated	  with	  flu	  virus.	  Encourage	  your	  city’s	  large	  employers	  to	  stagger	  work	  hours,	  so	  that	  public	  transportation	  subways	  and	  busses	  are	  less	  crowded	  during	  now-­‐stretched-­‐out	  rush	  hours.	  Even	  run	  the	  subways	  and	  busses	  with	  windows	  opened.12	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Targeting	  High	  Activity	  Populations	  As	  we	  have	  discussed,	  the	  at-­‐risk	  population	  is	  heterogeneous	  in	  its	  social	  activity	  and	  in	  its	  susceptibility	  to	  contract	  and	  transmit	  illness.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  to	  consider	  how	  social	  behavior	  influences	  the	  propagation	  of	  disease.	  The	  model	  results	  demonstrate	  convincingly	  that	  targeting	  high	  activity	  population	  components	  have	  the	  greatest	  role	  in	  transmitting	  illness	  and	  can	  have	  great	  impact	  on	  how	  quickly	  the	  outbreak	  can	  be	  controlled.	  	  High	  activity	  members	  of	  a	  population	  can	  contribute	  to	  mitigating	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  outbreak	  by	  accepting	  vaccine	  to	  reduce	  their	  own	  susceptibility	  and	  transmissibility,	  by	  reducing	  human	  contacts,	  and	  by	  adopting	  NPIs	  to	  reduce	  transmissibility.	  	  	  Vaccines	  offer	  greatest	  societal	  benefit	  when	  administered	  early	  to	  highly	  active	  population	  members.	  This	  observation	  should	  be	  considered	  when	  constituting	  “high	  risk”	  groups	  to	  be	  offered	  early	  access	  to	  immunization.	  In	  addition	  to	  first	  responders,	  health	  care	  workers,	  elderly	  and	  chronically	  ill,	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  first	  available	  doses	  of	  vaccine	  might	  be	  targeted	  to	  those	  individuals	  having	  large	  numbers	  of	  daily	  human	  contacts.	  	  Diligent	  personal	  hygiene	  among	  high	  activity	  persons	  benefits	  not	  only	  themselves,	  but	  also	  others	  with	  whom	  they	  have	  contact,	  and	  can	  have	  a	  disproportionate	  role	  in	  reducing	  spread.	  Hence,	  there	  should	  be	  great	  value	  in	  targeting	  these	  same	  groups	  with	  messaging	  to	  adopt	  NPIs.	  	  How	  to	  target	  persons	  having	  high	  frequencies	  of	  human	  contacts?	  Public	  health	  practices	  commonly	  address	  school	  age	  children	  and	  others	  spending	  time	  in	  closed	  and	  confined	  quarters.	  Those	  who	  make	  use	  of	  our	  various	  transportation	  networks	  are	  also	  thought	  of	  as	  potentially	  disproportionate	  illness	  transmitters.	  Consideration	  has	  been	  given	  to	  imposing	  travel	  restrictions,	  however,	  many	  published	  articles	  suggest	  that	  it	  offers	  low	  payoff,	  at	  best.13	  	  Users	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  public	  transportation	  –	  subways,	  trains,	  buses	  and	  planes	  –	  can	  be	  considered	  “high	  activity”	  and	  targeted	  for	  behavior	  change,	  that	  can	  include,	  depending	  on	  outbreak	  severity,	  encouragement	  to	  take	  vaccine	  and	  practice	  various	  NPIs.	  Short	  of	  any	  mandated	  shutdown	  of	  transport	  networks,	  voluntary	  measures,	  if	  adopted,	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  major	  contributions	  to	  control	  of	  an	  outbreak.	  	  Potential	  benefits	  from	  this	  approach	  extend	  to	  individuals	  engaging	  in	  private	  modes	  of	  transportation,	  including	  taxicabs,	  carpools	  and	  even	  solo	  commuters,	  who	  come	  in	  contact	  with	  others	  at	  gasoline	  stations	  and	  fast	  food	  restaurants.	  	  The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  targeting	  members	  of	  a	  highly	  active	  population	  group	  to	  change	  behavior	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  successful	  than	  a	  broad	  public	  campaign.	  This	  has	  proven	  true	  in	  the	  marketing	  of	  many	  consumer	  products	  and	  in	  screening	  for	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treatable	  illness,	  and	  would	  be	  very	  worthwhile	  in	  the	  control	  of	  outbreaks	  of	  infectious	  disease.	  	  
Vaccine	  Allocation	  In	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  pandemic,	  vaccines	  arrived	  late.	  	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  due	  to	  the	  six	  or	  more	  month	  delay	  between	  identifying	  a	  novel	  flu	  virus,	  inventing	  an	  appropriate	  new	  vaccine,	  and	  manufacturing	  it	  for	  distribution.	  	  The	  pandemic	  was	  already	  well	  underway	  in	  the	  U.S.	  when	  vaccine	  distribution	  commenced	  in	  October	  of	  2009.	  	  Early	  deliveries	  were	  rationed	  and	  delivered	  to	  collections	  of	  states	  (“regions”)	  by	  the	  CDC	  in	  direct	  proportion	  to	  each	  region’s	  census	  population,	  regardless	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  flu	  wave	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  deployment	  method	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  driven	  by	  perceptions	  of	  equity	  and	  other	  “political”	  considerations.	  	  	  	  We	  conjecture	  that	  the	  timeliness	  of	  vaccines	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  who	  will	  accept	  vaccines.	  During	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  outbreak	  in	  Mississippi,	  for	  example,	  less	  than	  40%	  of	  its	  allocated	  vaccine	  was	  used,	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  “flu	  fatigue”.	  	  South	  Carolina	  managed	  to	  immunize	  only	  8%	  of	  its	  population.	  Had	  vaccine	  been	  available	  and	  delivered	  there	  before	  the	  outbreak	  peaked,	  its	  effectiveness	  would	  have	  been	  greater	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  disease	  dynamics	  and	  participation	  rate.	  Similar	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  many	  other	  states,	  especially	  in	  the	  U.S.	  southeast,	  where	  schools	  open	  in	  August	  and	  the	  flu	  waves	  started	  then.	  	  Our	  model	  results	  suggest	  that	  incorporating	  an	  adaptive	  component	  to	  the	  allocation	  of	  vaccine	  during	  an	  outbreak	  will	  reduce	  the	  eventual	  number	  of	  infections.	  The	  peak	  of	  an	  infection	  is	  expected	  to	  occur	  when	  “herd	  immunity”	  is	  achieved,	  after	  which	  every	  contagious	  person	  infects,	  on	  average,	  one	  person	  or	  fewer.	  Early	  administration	  of	  vaccines,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  eventual	  peak	  of	  the	  outbreak	  decreases	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  who	  remain	  to	  be	  infected	  or	  protected.	  Late	  administration	  has	  marginal	  effect	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  an	  initial	  outbreak,	  but	  could	  still	  prove	  to	  be	  important,	  if	  flu	  returns	  in	  a	  later	  wave.	  	  	  Our	  model	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  CDC’s	  population-­‐based	  flu	  allocation	  approach	  is	  far	  from	  optimal,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  minimize	  the	  total	  number	  of	  flu	  infections	  that	  will	  occur	  nationally.	  	  Rather	  its	  objective	  function	  is	  to	  equalize	  per	  capita	  distribution	  of	  the	  vaccine	  regardless	  of	  its	  potential	  flu-­‐averting	  benefits	  nationally.	  	  A	  better	  policy	  would	  be	  to	  allocate	  vaccine	  not	  in	  proportion	  to	  state	  populations,	  but	  to	  vulnerable	  regions	  that	  have	  seen	  fewer	  cases,	  that	  will	  have	  a	  higher	  fraction	  of	  its	  population	  susceptible,	  and	  thus	  where	  a	  vaccine	  can	  avert	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  future	  infections.	  	  Our	  flu	  vaccine	  deployment	  method,	  if	  it	  had	  been	  used	  in	  2009,	  would	  likely	  have	  averted	  about	  7,000,000	  of	  the	  estimated	  21,000,000	  Americans	  infected	  with	  H1N1	  flu.14	  
	  
Limitations	  The	  full	  formulations	  of	  the	  models	  and	  interpretation,	  as	  well	  as	  limitations	  of	  the	  analyses	  have	  been	  published	  elsewhere.15	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CONCLUSION	  Outbreaks	  of	  influenza	  can	  be	  grave	  threats	  to	  lives	  and	  to	  the	  security	  of	  our	  homeland.	  A	  great	  benefit	  of	  our	  efforts	  to	  engineer	  effective	  response	  to	  seasonal	  outbreaks	  of	  influenza	  or	  pandemic	  influenza,	  is	  that	  it	  forced	  a	  logical	  and	  systematic	  consideration	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  value	  of	  immunization	  is	  greatly	  enhanced	  when	  it	  is	  deployed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  illness.	  The	  benefits	  from	  diligent	  personal	  hygiene	  and	  social	  distancing,	  while	  widely	  recognized,	  can	  be	  much	  greater	  if	  public	  education	  initiatives	  are	  targeted	  toward	  population	  members	  having	  disproportionate	  numbers	  of	  human	  contacts.	  We	  are	  hopeful	  that	  the	  approaches	  we	  have	  described	  and	  the	  results	  obtained	  offer	  the	  prospects	  of	  mitigating	  the	  future	  impact	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  adverse	  events.	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